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2. Negotiating settlements in a broader 
law enforcement context
Mark Pieth
1. THE AMBIGUITY OF NEGOTIATED 
SETTLEMENTS
Negotiated settlements to end criminal proceedings are a modern topic. And 
yet, one should not take for granted that countries see eye to eye on this issue. 
In times when plea agreements were used primarily in US procedures against 
individuals, continental European lawyers were full of disdain: in their view, 
settlements went against all established principles of fair procedure. They 
were considered a breach of the concept of equality; they went – in their view 
– against the notion of legality, of the search for material truth and typically 
defendants were forced to give up their privilege against self-incrimination.1
Times have changed with the expansion of corporate criminal liability. 
Corporations are typically complex institutions. They find it easy to struc-
ture themselves in a multitude of subsidiaries and similar sub-entities. Law 
enforcement agencies are frequently at a loss to detect the responsible entity 
or managers. Some authors speak of the ‘corporate fortress’.2 With intensified 
regulation on bribery of foreign public officials,3 international organizations 
placed far more emphasis on corporate liability.4 Whereas the Anglo-Saxon 
countries had developed corporate criminal liability from the early 20th centu-
1 Cf. niklaUs oBerholzer, grUndzüge des strafProzessrechts dargestellt 
am BeisPiel des kantons st. gallen 525 (2nd ed. 2005).
2 gorm toftegaard nielsen, Procedural Law for Corporate Entities: A Danish 
View, in corPorate resPonsiBility of legal and collective entities 321 et seq. 
(Albin Eser, Günter Heine and Barbara Huber eds., 1999).
3 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, adopted by the Negotiating Conference on 21 
November 1997. 
4 Ibid. Art. 2.
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ry,5 continental European countries (and with them Asian and Latin-American 
states) took far more time to follow suit. Some countries, such as Belgium, 
Denmark, France and the Netherlands, adopted laws primarily to combat 
environmental crime between the 1970s and the 1990s. A real worldwide 
move to establish corporate liability for economic crime was closely linked to 
regulation on money laundering and corruption between 1990 and 2000.
Even if some countries have introduced abbreviated proceedings involving 
negotiations between law enforcement and individual defendants, the main 
debate on settlements, in particular in corruption cases, focuses on proceedings 
against corporate entities. 
2. ADVANTAGES
Beyond complexity and the lack of transparency of corporate structures, 
several other reasons are given for negotiated settlements: law enforcement 
agencies are generally understaffed and overwhelmed by their workload. In 
some countries laws against economic crime are insufficient. As an example, 
one might mention the Italian Statute of Limitation, which is short in duration 
and runs on until the final instance, an arrangement leading to as much as 60 
per cent of corruption proceedings ending up time barred.6 Settlements have 
contributed to increasing the level of successful prosecution of corporate 
corruption. This is an observation that may be made for France and the UK 
since they have endorsed settlement regimes. Another example of deficient 
legislation is the Swiss law on confiscation. Slush funds destined for bribery 
are considered too remote from the actual crime to be confiscated even if the 
general purpose – keeping a nest egg for future bribery – is clearly established.7 
In such untested legal situations, both parties may prefer a negotiated outcome 
to the uncertainty of a court ruling. Further reasons motivating settlement are 
the difficulties in obtaining convincing evidence from abroad, in particular in 
transnational bribery cases. Finally, settlements have motivated companies to 
develop adequate compliance regimes. In a wider sense, an entire compliance 
industry has been fostered, in particular by US settlement practice. 
5 mark Pieth and rhada ivory, Emergence and Convergence: Corporate 
Criminal Liability Principles in Overview, in corPorate criminal liaBility, 
emergence, convergence, and risk 7 et seq. (Mark Pieth and Rhada Ivory eds., 
2011).
6 OECD Working Group on Bribery, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention in Italy, December 2011, para. 13.
7 mark Pieth, wirtschaftsstrafrecht 91 et seq. (with further references) 
(2016).
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The advantages of settlements for both law enforcement and the defendant 
are obvious: instead of protracted proceedings, keeping the company in the 
news headlines and entailing the risk of prescription for the prosecution, both 
parties gain from settlement. For the prosecution, settlements have the advan-
tage of a quick win; companies, on the other hand, are in a better position to 
calculate their costs. 
3. BROKERING OF SETTLEMENTS BY PRIVATE 
MEDIATORS?
To expand on the Swiss example above of how law enforcement and defence 
may find a joint solution, I can add a recent Swiss anecdote on a settlement 
that I helped broker personally. Law enforcement agencies had frozen several 
hundred millions of dollars of a company accused of large-scale transnational 
bribery. The proceedings were not advancing, as law enforcement was afraid 
that the funds would be returned to the company, even though they were 
clearly destined for bribery, although not yet earmarked for specific contracts. 
Various opinions of professors were written, coming to diverging conclusions. 
The prosecution feared that the case would become time barred. 
On the other hand, the company remained continuously in the media as the 
case dragged on. It was interested in terminating the case – if possible – obtain-
ing at least part of the money back and knowing how much money to write off. 
In this impasse, I offered to both parties to hear them out and to suggest 
a possible outcome. The first session was held in the offices of the national 
prosecution agency, the next two at the university: both the company and the 
prosecutors had to take the suggestion home. It was then, with a few minor 
changes, transformed into an official agreement. The prosecution services 
freed a certain amount of the seized funds and forfeited the rest. The company 
waived its appeals and the solution was implemented with the agreement of 
both parties. 
What may seem an elegant way out of an impasse is of course the conse-
quence of unclear legislation or slow justice.
4. CHALLENGES
Even though settlements are increasingly used in trials against corporate crime 
on a worldwide scale, the legal profession and the wider public are far from 
convinced: there is a clear tendency to settle rather than to test legal arguments 
in court. Inevitably, the law is losing its precision. Settlements are also con-
sidered a form of privatization of justice: typically, a company will, upon its 
own initiative, or in agreement with the prosecution, engage private internal 
investigators (law firms and forensics companies). Lawyers will negotiate on 
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the basis of the outcome of this investigation and the parties will replace the 
judiciary. In many instances, the wider public is right to suspect that companies 
are let off lightly. Such an experience was made in one of the first negotiated 
settlements the UK’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) struck on corruption: in the 
BAE corruption case relating to the delivery of a radar system to Tanzania. The 
company did not have to admit guilt, the sanction was minimal and the facts 
were largely drafted by company lawyers.8 In a similar way, the NGO Human 
Rights Watch is correct in its criticism of Swiss prosecutors.9 In the recent case 
of the son of President Obiang of Equatorial Guinea, Swiss prosecutors struck 
a deal with the defendant and the relevant country, confiscating 25 vehicles 
and CHF 1.3 million to pay court fees in Geneva,10 while, however, releasing 
to the culprit his yacht Ebony Shine, valued at €100 million. That settlements 
allow defendants to be let off lightly is highly problematic. It calls into ques-
tion one of the key principles of the criminal justice system: it goes against 
equal treatment. 
5. SETTLEMENTS UNDERMINED BY CANADA’S 
POLITICIANS
Settlements have also been called into question by a recent crisis in Canada. 
The current Prime Minister Justin Trudeau sent his senior officials to suggest 
that the Minister of Justice and Attorney General Jody Wilson-Raybould find 
a settlement in a large international corruption case involving the engineering 
company SNC-Lavalin. When she steadfastly insisted on taking the company 
to court, the Prime Minister and his collaborators lost their nerve; after all, 
SNC-Lavalin was Trudeau’s most important campaign contributor. Due to 
Canada’s automatic debarment law, he feared a dramatic loss of jobs in his key 
constituency. When Jody Wilson-Raybould refused to offer the company a set-
tlement, she was relieved of her office and pushed into the Veterans Ministry. 
This episode demonstrates that settlements are only acceptable if the public 
prosecutor is independent from political lobbying. This kind of settlement 
again calls into question a key feature of criminal justice: judges need to be 
independent from the executive power. This is what we have learned from the 
8 Ben Taylor, BAE payment to Tanzania undermines justice and accountability, 
the gUardian, 20 March 2012.
9 Sarah Saadoun, Swiss Prosecutors Squander Opportunity to Counter Kleptocracy, 
Equator Guinea Vice President Gets to Keep $100 Million Yacht in Settlement, hUman 
rights watch, 8 February 2019.
10 Stephanie Nebehay and John Stonestreet, Geneva closes graft case against 
Obiang’s son, confiscates 25 luxury cars, reUters, 7 February 2019.
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French Revolution. The Canadian example, therefore, seriously undermines 
the credibility of settlements. 
6. THE NEED TO REGULATE SETTLEMENT 
PROCEEDINGS
This brief overview of the advantages and challenges of settlement leads to 
a call for action: we need regulation. States allowing their prosecution services 
to enter into settlements need to establish a clear legal basis and to define 
standards and procedural rules. From experience I am aware that in the past, 
settlements have been struck totally outside official standards – in particular in 
the area of confiscation. What needs to be clarified in particular are the rules 
on fair hearing. Furthermore, states need to define the menu ranging from 
deferred prosecution or closure against restitution to guilty pleas linked to an 
acknowledgement of guilt. A fundamental issue is whether the agreements are 
subject to judicial approval. Obviously, even if a judge has to sign off on the 
settlement, typically after a short public proceeding, the judge would not be 
given the right to hear the case de novo; rather, he or she would need to decide 
whether to accept or refuse. In the case of refusal a further problem arises: 
what should become of evidence submitted voluntarily and of confessions 
by the accused? Regularly, this type of evidence would need to be eliminated 
from the file11 since it is influenced by the hope of leniency. This is a conse-
quence of the classic right against self-incrimination. 
If negotiated settlements were to win public trust, the facts of the case would 
need to be made public. However, there may be reasons for exceptions, such 
as commercial or state secrecy or the names of third parties who are implicated 
but did not get a chance to defend themselves. 
Finally, the principle of double jeopardy (or ne bis in idem) poses far greater 
challenges than in the ordinary procedure. As the facts are negotiated, they 
represent a kind of formal rather than substantive truth. Furthermore, if the 
facts are drafted in a cursory, imprecise manner, the downside for the corpo-
ration may be that the agreement does not prevent future proceedings in the 
same matter. 
7. INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION
Increasingly, countries cooperate in combating transnational bribery. Also 
from a company perspective, it is reasonable to negotiate collectively with 
several jurisdictions. However, joint negotiations require a minimum of 
11 E.g. Art. 362(4) of the Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure.
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harmonization of standards. This is the main reason why the OECD Working 
Group on Bribery should follow the advice of the ‘Recommendation 6 
Network’ to draft an ‘International Guideline for Non-Trial Resolutions of 
Foreign Bribery Cases’.12
12 Developed by a working party following the presentation of the March 2017 
Report of the Recommendations of the Secretary General’s High Level Advisory 
Group. 
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